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The contract is widely conceived as an effective 
approach to decrease risk perception and resolve 
disputes. However, previous literature on the link 
between contracts and risk perception is contradictory, 
wherein both positive and negative findings exist. This 
study provides a novel insight about the mechanism of 
contractual dimensions and considers the boundary 
conditions of information technology (IT) integration. 
Data collected from 225 retailers of a manufacturer 
support most hypotheses. Specifically, contractual 
complexity has a positive influence on relational risk, 
and contractual recurrence has a negative influence on 
both performance and relational risk. This study 
further reveals the positive moderating effect of IT 
integration on the influence of contractual complexity 
on relational risk and the negative effect of IT 
integration on the influence of contractual recurrence 
on relational risk and performance risk. Implications 




The last decades witnessed the expansion of 
collaborative network where focal firms 
simultaneously interact with plenty of partners for 
external resources [1-3]. However, the fear of 
uncertainty about the economic and collaboration is 
inherent in these relationships [3]. Such concern of risk 
makes both parties discreet on engaging in 
relationships and ultimately impedes the creation of 
joint value [4, 5]. Conceivably, it is pivotal for focal 
firms to decrease their counterparts’perceived risk 
regarding maintaining a relationship and achieving 
performance [5-8]. However, as scholars pointed out, 
“practices to manage inter-firm risks and enhance 
collaborative action have received much less research 
attention” [9, p. 2]. Accordingly, investigating how to 
reduce partners’ risk perception not only solves the 
collaborative problem faced by focal firms but also 
bridges research gaps in risk management. 
The contract is widely conceived as an effective 
approach to decrease risk perception and resolve 
disputes [10, 11]. Some contracts contain a large 
number of provisions which obviates moral hazards 
and attenuates the leeway for opportunism [8, 12, 13]. 
Others seek to codify as little as possible and focus 
heavily on ensuring that the parties have a shared 
understanding of the relationship so that they can 
coordinate partners optimally [14]. These mixed 
understanding impede the advancement of this line of 
research and manifest the necessity to identify how to 
reduce risk perception by contract design.  
We find researchers suggest that parties are more 
stable when stress coordination mechanism than when 
contracts focus on safeguard mechanism [15-17]. 
Hence, we raise the coordination function of contract 
in the context of risk perception [14, 18]. This study is 
an effort to address such theoretical gap by 
investigating how to reduce risk perception by 
designing contract for coordination. 
Poppo and Zhou [19] refine contractual dimensions 
which include both safeguard and coordination 
mechanism. One dimension is contract complexity 
which considers many future contingencies that would 
change the value of performance—increases in the 
costs of their inputs, the decline in demand for the 
products, and so on [20]. The other dimension is 
contract recurrence which refers to whether parties rely 
on the expectation of continued exchanges to 
collaborate with their partners [19].  
Inter-firm information technology (IT) artifacts 
play an increasingly crucial role in contract governance 
[21]. As Chi, Zhao [22] claimed, many firms use 
highly integrated IT artifacts to facilitate electronic 
data interchange. For example, Amazon.com provides 
an information system for hundreds of retailers to 
create value for its partners by providing information 
integration for searching, ordering, and communication 
to reduce conflict beyond contracts [23]. These highly 
integrated information systems provide a key platform 
to coordinate parties that enables them to acquire 
information and use it to interact effectively [24-26]. 
According to transaction cost economy (TCE) 
perspective, effective information flow supported by 
integrated IT artifacts aligns well to contracts for 
coping with hazards [27]. Specifically, IT integration 
brings behavioral transparency which improves 
awareness of both parties on how contracts are 
implemented. 
Moreover, frequent and instant communications are 






facilitated by integrated IT artifacts, which is 
conducive to reaching a consensus of understanding 
contract clauses to guide their collaboration. The 
effectiveness of contract framing on reducing 
perceived risk is enhanced as a consequence. Although 
incorporating IT integration in the relationship between 
contract framing and risk perception is important; its 
moderating role has not been investigated so far. 
Therefore, our research is a trial to address this 
research gap by exploring how IT integration 
moderates the relationship between contract framing 
and risk perception. 
These gaps form the basis of our conceptual model, 
which examines how contracts, risk perceptions, and 
IT integration are intertwined. We ask (1) How does 
the coordination mechanism of contract (i.e., 
contractual complexity and recurrence) differentially 
reduce risk perception (i.e., performance risk and 
relational risk)? (2) How does IT integration moderate 
the relationship between these contractual dimensions 














Figure1. Research model 
 
 
2. Conceptual development 
 
2.1 Transaction Cost Economy 
 
Over the last twenty years, the standard framework 
for analyzing questions regarding the choice of 
organizational governance form has been transaction 
cost theory. TCE describes the firm as an 
efficiency-inducing administrative instrument that 
facilitates exchange between parties. Also, TCE 
emphasizes on the deeper and more cooperative 
responses that are available through conscious, 
deliberate, and purposeful coordination. According to 
TCE, it is costly to negotiate and write complete 
contingent claims contracts that fully describe each 
party’s responsibilities and rights for all future 
contingencies [19]. Contract is hard to be complete. 
Also, some researchers point out the continuity of 
exchange is vital to its effectiveness based on TCE [27]. 
As such, this study builds on TCE as the theoretical 
underpinning to explain how the complexity of 
contract and the continuity of an exchange affect risk 
perception. 
 
2.2 Perceived risks 
 
Perceived risk is often defined as the probability of 
unfavorable outcomes, which is hard to be estimated 
[28]. There are two types of risk in perceived risk. One 
refers to the partner not cooperating in good faith 
(namely, relational risk), in addition to the usual risk of 
unsatisfactory business performance (called 
performance risk). In inter-organizational collaborative 
relationships, relational risk is defined as the 
probability and consequences of not having 
satisfactory cooperation [6]. This risk arises because of 
the potential for opportunistic behavior and conflicts 
on the part of both firms. Opportunistic behavior is in 
shirking, cheating, distorting information, 
appropriating resources, and so on. Conflicts arise 
because firms have their interests that are not 
necessarily congruent with those of their partners [28]. 
Besides relational risk, many other factors may 
adversely affect performance. These factors include 
intensified rivalry, new entrants, demand fluctuations, 
changing government policies, a lack of competence of 
the partner firms, and sheer bad luck. These factors 
account for performance risk, or the probability and 
consequences that objectives are not achieved, despite 
satisfactory cooperation among partner firms [6]. 
Page 362
 
The improvement of perceived risk can help to 
maintain a relationship and achieve performance [5]. 
Control is widely acknowledged as essential in 
inter-organizational relationships to reduce perceived 
risk [5, 6]. Contract is an important part of control 
governance in an inter-organizational relationship [29]. 
Hence, we take contracts into consideration, which 
helps to understand how to decrease the perceived risk. 
 
2.3 Contracts   
 
Researchers framed contracts into 
contingency-based complexity and incentive-based 
recurrence [19]. Contractual complexity is the 
flexibility of contract and takes “account of many 
future contingencies that would change the value of 
performance—increases in the costs of inputs, the 
decline in demand for the product, and so on” [20]. 
When change forces two parties to adapt or modify an 
initial agreement, a contract which accounts of many 
future contingencies offers guidelines to avoid an 
inequitable state [30]. Contractual recurrence is the 
continuity of contract and refers to whether parties rely 
on the expectation of continued exchanges to 
collaborate with their partners [19]. Partners with the 
expectation of long collaboration want to have a stable, 
reciprocal strategy in the further. Researchers highlight 
the coordinating frame of contracting can motivate 
parties to cooperate [19]. As such, this study builds on 
TCE as the theoretical underpinning to explain how the 
coordinating of contract affects risks. 
 
2.4 Contracts and perceived risk 
 
Complex contracts usually include many 
contingency clauses, which provide a more 
comprehensive solution and makes the adaptive 
adjustments in a changeable environment. When 
parties articulate many contingencies in their contracts, 
they seek to accommodate the transaction to a variety 
of states or future possibilities, thereby easing conflict 
and disputes of performance. Under these situations, 
they will promote efficiency and produce the positive 
performance outcome and reduce performance risk.  
When the contract includes too many specific 
contingencies clauses, partners may be cannot follow 
all the details of the contract. Once they do not finish 
the rules or do something little inconsistent with the 
contract, such behavior may be claimed as the 
destruction of the rule and easily break the friendship 
between them, turning a collaborator into an 
antagonist. 
Contract recurrence indicates that partners have 
expectations of which extend beyond the duration of 
the current contract and stress the long-term 
contractual partnerships [16]. Partners are willing to 
fulfill the performance agreement because they believe 
they will be rewarded through repeat business [31]. As 
Poppo, Zhou [32] demonstrated, because both of them 
have the shared intent to honor the performance 
agreement, the recurrent exchanges can realize higher 
performance. 
When exchange parties hold a long-term view of 
the exchange, they are motivated to cooperate [33]. 
Such incentive alignment associated with greater 
expectations of continued exchange can promote 
collaborative relationship [32]. If parties expect to 
transact with one another, they will ‘try to resolve any’ 
conflicts [32]. According to SET, to get more benefits 
in the future, the reciprocal behavior will reduce the 
uncertainty and risks. Thus, if the focal firm place 
sufficient value on continued transactions, they will 
keep a good relationship with the parties. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
Moderating roles of information integration 
 
With the development of information integration, 
for performance risk with complex contracts, partners 
can get enough communications, and they will know 
each other deeply. If they have something confused, 
they can easily find relevant information because of the 
highly integrated information system. According to 
transaction cost economy (TCE) perspective, effective 
information flow supported by integrated IT artifacts 
aligns well to contracts for coping with hazards. Also, 
highly integrated information can increase their task 
efficiency and decrease the Jumbled procedure to get 
what you want as soon as possible. Frequent and 
instant communications are facilitated by integrated IT 
technology, which is conducive to reaching a 
consensus of understanding contract clauses to guide 
their collaboration. 
However, for relational risk with complex contracts, 
contract with so many contingencies have already 
threatened the harmony relationship. In such a situation, 
Partners may feel be monitored on the collaboration. It 
may take deep this harmful relationship if the IT 
integration is still very high. Hence, we propose the 
following. 
H1: IT integration positively moderates the effect 
of contractual complexity on performance risk. 
H2: IT integration positively moderates the effect 
of contractual complexity on relational risk. 
 
Contract recurrence is a symbol of continuous 
collaboration, which means that both parties know 
each other well. If they have perceived high contract 
recurrence, they will rely more on the expectation of 
continued exchanges to coordinate and safeguard 
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transactions instead of information flows online. A lot 
of roles have been established by usage, and they need 
to follow the routine. So we propose the following.  
H3: IT integration negatively moderates the effect 
of contractual recurrence on performance risk. 
H4: IT integration negatively moderates the effect 




4.1. Data collection 
 
To test above hypotheses, we collaborated with a 
large water heater manufacturer in China called 
Company C. China is an ideal research setting, 
typifying an emerging market because of its population, 
fast growing economy, increased liberalization of most 
economic sectors and its role as a global manufacturing 
center. China has become an indispensable part of the 
global supply chain. This study collected 428 survey 
questionnaires from the retailers of Company C. 
Finally, 225 valid questionnaires were collected with a 
response rate of approximately 53%. Following 
Armstrong and Overton [34], we tested for potential 
non-response bias. We compare the chi-squares of the 
key measures of the responses from the first 25% of 
the respondents and those of the final 25%. We did not 
observe significant differences between the two groups 
on these items. This result indicated that non-response 
bias was not serious in this study. The demographic 
information is shown in Table 1. 
  
 
Table 1. Demographic information 
 Frequency Percent (%) 
Number of employees   
Less than 10 23 10.222 
10–50 87 38.667 
51–100 48 21.333 
More than 100 67 29.778 
Firm age   
Less than 4 years 35 15.556 
4–6 52 23.110 
7–10 69 30.667 
More than 10 69 30.667 
Number of IT employees   
Less than 2 135 60.000 
2–4 84 37.333 




An English questionnaire was first developed 
according to previously validated measures from the 
existing literature. We hired a translator who was 
unfamiliar to this research to translate the questionnaire 
into Chinese. The translated questionnaire was sent to 
both scholars and practitioners to check for readability 
and accuracy. After being revised regarding some items, 
the Chinese version was translated back to English by 
another professional translator. Finally, we carefully 
compared the back-translated questionnaire with the 
original one and determined no significant semantic 
difference between both versions. Thus, the 
questionnaire in Chinese is equivalent to that in 
English. 
All items were measured on five-point Likert scales, 
which ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree.” The measurement items for the dependent 
variable, namely, relational risk, were adapted from Liu 
[35]. Relational risk (RSK) arising from firm-firm 
interaction, whereas performance risk (PSK) from the 
firm-environment interaction.  
We used scales from Poppo and Zhou [19] to 
measure the buyer-supplier contract, namely, contract 
complexity (CC) and contract recurrence (CR). We 
measured IT integration [25]. We used three items 
adapted from Rai and Tang [25]. IT integration refers 
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to the ability of a firm to integrate data, communication 
technologies, and transaction and collaboration 
applications with its IR portfolio. 
We also considered firm size (SIZE), firm age 
(AGE), the number of IT staff (ITD), justice and 
relationship length (Length) as control variables, which 
may influence the perceived risk of buyer firms. For 
example, firms with large IT departments feature 
sufficient human capital in reducing risks [36]. A large 
number of IT staff also indicates high IT capability, 
which helps the firm manage the relationship with 
suppliers in the future [24]. Thus, the number of IT 
staff may negatively affect perceived risk. 
 
5 Data analysis 
 
We initially checked the possible common method 
bias caused by perceptual data, which were collected 
from a single source at one point in time, common 
method bias was tested as follows. Then, we adopted 
Harman's one-factor test. With eigenvalues greater than 
1.0 and account for 69.16% of the variance. The first 
component did not account for the majority of the 
variance (34.76%). All method factor loadings are 
insignificant as well. The results of the tests ensure that 
common method bias is unlikely to be an issue in the 
study. Thus, common method bias was not a grave 
concern in this study according to Harman’s one-factor 
test.  
 
5.1. Common method bias 
 
This study employed SPSS19.0 to evaluate the 
validity and reliability of the measurement model. In 
Table 2, loadings of all items are above the criterion of 
0.6 and scores of for AVEs of all constructs are greater 
than the benchmark value of 0.50. Estimates of 
Cronbach's Alpha and composite reliability are higher 
than the benchmark value of 0.70. These results 
indicate that a favorable convergent validity and 
reliability of the measurement model of this study. We 
assessed discriminate validity following the method 
suggested by Paulraj, Lado [37], in which the 
correlation between two constructs and the 
corresponding AVE score were compared. Table 3 
shows that the correlations among constructs were 
lower than the corresponding square root of AVE score. 
The result suggested the good discriminate validity of 
this dataset. 
 
Table 2. Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, AVE, and loading of indication variables. 
 
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
 
Note: The diagonal elements are the square roots of AVEs;* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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5.2 Hypotheses testing 
 
Hierarchical regression analysis is conducted to test 
the hypotheses. We standardize the variables to 
minimize the possibility of multicollinearity [38]. As 
shown in Model 1 of Table 4, justice significantly has 
related to relational and performance risk. Model 2 is a 
model that contained independent variables. Model 3 
adds moderators. Model 4 includes all the variables. 
The results showed that most of the hypotheses were 
supported, except Hypothesis 4 (β = -0.139, p＞0.01). 
IT capability × contractual complexity relates 
negatively to performance risk (β = 0.180, p＜0.001), 
in support of Hypothesis 1. IT integration × contractual 
complexity relates positively to relational risk (β = 
0.258, p＜ 0.05), in support of Hypothesis 2. IT 
capability × contractual recurrence relates negatively to 
performance risk (β = -0.195, p＜0.01), in support of 
Hypothesis 3. 
To further analyze the moderating effects, we 
follow the graphical procedure suggested by Aiken, 
West [38] to draw Figs. 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Table 4. Results of hierarchical regression analysis 
 
 




Figure 3. Moderating effect of information integration on relationship between contract recurrence and relational risk 
 
Figure 4. Moderating effect of information integration on relationship between contract recurrence and performance risk
 
6. Discussion  
 
We established a theoretical context to investigate 
the proposition that contractual dimensions can 
decrease risk perception in the Chinese context. The 
findings support the basic premise of TCE that contract 
governance plays a crucial role in inter-organizational 
relationship. This study reveals the positive moderating 
effect of IT integration on the influence of contractual 
complexity on relational risk and the negative effect of 
IT integration on the influence of contractual 
recurrence on relational risk and performance risk. 
The results of this study do not support the 
hypothesis of the association between contractual 
complexity and performance risk. Based on TCE, the 
adaptive environment is more prone to opportunism 
due to bounded rationality [21]. Thus, the performance 
risk cannot be improved when the contract is 
complexity.  
 
7. Implications and limitations 
7.1. Practical implications  
 
The findings of this study also offer managerial 
implications for suppliers in designing contract. When 
drafting complex clauses, lawyers should avoid 
stressing the basis of conflict and change. It takes time 
to learn how to craft better contracts; managers may 
pay attention to some important contingencies they do 
not need to cover all of them. Managers should adopt 
appropriate procedures to result in fewer risk 
perceptions.  
Our results also suggest that when drafting complex 
clauses, managers should think more carefully to 
integrate the information, which may be seen as a kind 
of electronic surveillance. Under such situation, 
contractual complexity fosters greater risk perceptions. 
Further, contractual recurrence can efficiently 
incentivize cooperation by setting expectations that 
“you expect to be working together for a long time.” 
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Our findings suggest managers must give a deep 
understand of recurrent transactions. Such procedure 
will weaken risk perception if managers frequently 
integrate their information. From our findings, 
managers can attempt to integrate with its buyers, 
emphasizing that our contracts are not complex and our 
purpose is to build a long-term relationship with our 
partners.  
 
7.2. Limitations and future research 
 
Evaluating the contributions of this study in light of 
certain limitations is necessary. First, we highlight the 
boundary role of information integration in effect on 
contract and perceived risk. However, considering 
other IT factors is also very important. Future research 
can consider other relevant factors that were 
investigated in inter-organizational relationships, such 
as absorbing ability and information sharing to enrich 
the current understanding of the relationship between 
contract and perceived risk. Second, all key constructs 
in this study were measured by the perceptions of 
individual respondents, which are subjective. Although 
our analysis results prove that the common method bias 
is not a serious problem, future researchers must use 
objective data or collect data from multiple informants. 
Third, the generalizability of our findings may be 
limited by the demography of respondents because we 
only measured the retailers of one manufacturer. Doing 
so may enhance the internal validity of this study but 
may limit its external validity. Therefore, scholars and 
practitioners should exercise caution in generalizing 
our findings to a company located in different 
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